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Drawing on Schumpeterian theory, this article presents estimates of a first-order autoregressive model of profit 
persistence for large US firms, using Economic Value Added (EVA), the popular measure of profits produced by Stern 
Stewart and Company, and simple (unadjusted) accounting measures from the Compustat database. We hypothesize 
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assessment of the dynamic competitiveness of the US economy.
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1 Introduction 
 
Dennis Mueller (1977, 1986, 1990) initiated what has by now become a fairly large, 
mainly empirical literature that seeks to make a normative evaluation of the dynamic 
efficiency of the market economy.  Rather than taking it for granted that the economy is 
in long-run equilibrium at every moment, this (Schumpeterian) literature seeks to 
measure the speed of the transition to competitive equilibrium, as well as to determine if 
long-run firm behavior is consistent with such an equilibrium.  There are now more than 
a dozen economies for which persistence estimates are available,2 and there will soon be 
larger scope for finding socioeconomic and institutional determinates of persistence.   
However, the accounting measures that are almost universally used in these 
studies are known to be subject to many types of measurement error.3  We must 
therefore address the measurement issue before any comparative institutional analysis 
can occur.  Several of the recent contributions to the persistence literature have 
advanced the econometric theory behind the analysis,4 but, fewer studies have 
analyzed these measurement issues.5  Moreover no study has explored persistence 
using economic value added (EVA), the popular measure of profits produced by Stern 
Stewart and Company.  Our main contribution is to pit EVA against unadjusted 
accounting measures in an econometric horserace.   
The race our data will run is the first-order autoregressive model—the 
"AR(1)" –which has been the workhorse empirical model in the persistence of profits 
literature.  This model can also serve as a reduced form representation of a structural 
model of market competition (Geroski, 1990a). The resulting estimates of the AR(1) 
model allow the researcher to calculate 1.) if, and at what speed, profits converge 
onto the normal level, 2.) the long-run projected value of profits, and 3.) the model’s 
goodness of fit.   
These three values can then be used to shed light onto three different views of 
competition, with zero long-run profits as the neoclassical ideal, modest persistence 
as the classical ideal, and a low R2 as the ecological ideal (Geroski, 1990, pp. 15-28).   
Our estimates (and any other estimates of the AR(1) profits equation,) therefore shed 
light on dynamic competitiveness in terms of each of these three views of 
competition. 
Authors who employ unadjusted accounting measures often argue that the bias is 
not large or systematic, and so their estimates (at least on average) reflect an accurate 
view of actual competitiveness.  If EVA is a superior measure of economic profit, we 
                                                 
2 For the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany, Sweden and Canada, see Mueller (1990); for India, Malaysia, 
S. Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Jordan and Zimbabwe, see Glen et al. (2001); for India see Kambahampati 
(1995); for Japan, see Odagiri and Maruyama (2002); for Turkey, see Yurtoglu (2004); for the US see 
Gschwandtner (2005). 
3 Fisher and McGowan (1983) is the classic criticism of accounting profits; see also the discussion in 
Mueller (1990). 
4 See Crespo and Gschwandtner (2005, 2008), Bou and Satorra (2007), Cable and Jackson (2008) and 
Frankel and Lubomir (2009). 
5 In the literature, the few exceptions that we are aware of are Connoly and Schwartz (1985) and Villalonga 
(2004) who use Tobin’s Q, and Schwalbach and Mahmood, (1990) who use Maris’ V.  However unlike the 
market measures these authors use, the profit measure we use is primarily an adjusted accounting measure, 
though as we will explain, it does use market values in determining the cost of capital. 
should therefore expect better "fit" compared to previous studies, but a similar overall 
qualitative assessment of competitiveness.6  We test the proposition that R2 will be higher 
and other hypotheses, elaborated fully below, by comparing our results obtained when 
using EVA as a profit measure to those we obtained when using the raw Compustat data, 
from which we obtain measures of unadjusted profit rate.     
 
2 Accounting versus Economic Profit, and EVA 
 
In this section we briefly describe accounting versus economic measures of 
profits, and EVA. A large topic of debate in industrial organization (see for example the 
seminal article by Fisher and McGowan, 1983) has been on the use of various measures 
of profit. Stern, Stewart and Co. produces the data for our analysis, see Stewart et al. 
(1995).  Accounting profit (net income) does not take into consideration the opportunity 
cost of capital, while economic profit does. EVA is an attempt to measure economic 
profit: 
 
(1) EVAt = Ct – r Kt 
 
where Ct is cash flow in period t, r is the opportunity cost of capital and Kt is the value of 
capital the firm utilizes, i.e. the accumulated investment less depreciation. Ct takes into 
account all revenues and expenses except the opportunity cost of capital, which is what 
accounting profit measures. However the measurement of EVA from accounting data is 
not as straight forward as (1) suggests.  The following relationship measures EVA: 
 
      EVA = Cash flow from operations [a] 
+ Accruals (revenues earned but not received or expenses incurred but not 
paid) [b] 
+ After tax interest added back to get operating performance before 
financing costs [c] 
- Capital charge -- current cost of debt and equity [d] 
+ Adjustments made by Stern Stewart to correct accounting distortions [e] 
 
Net income before extraordinary items = [a]+[b] 
Net operating profits after taxes, NOPAT = [a]+[b+[c] 
 
EVA = [a]+[b+[c] +[d]+[e]  
 
The numerous adjustments made by Stern Stewart (represented by component [e]), are an 
attempt to correct what accounting fails to do. Figure 1 demonstrates some of these 
accounting limitations. 
                                                 
6 Kapler (2000) found that the adjusted R2 in a simple fixed-effects model was about 50% higher when she 
used her profit measure, which made five adjustments to net income.   However, the ratio of firm effects to 
industry effects was virtually identical in both data sets (in each case, industry effects explained about a 
third as much as firm effects) and so using her improved measure did not change our understanding of the 
relative importance of firm versus industry effects, even though the model had a better fit when using the 
economic profit measure.   
Figure 1  Accounting limitations and adjustments 
Area GAAP* Adjustments 
Advertising Expense: the entire 
expenditure is deducted 
during the period it occurs 
Record as asset and 
amortize over several years 
R&D Expense Record as asset and 
amortize over several years 
Bad debt Estimated accruals Reverse the accruals to 
reflect cash basis reporting 
Inventory Last-in-First-out (LIFO) Convert to First-in-first-out 
(FIFO) 
*GAAP: generally accepted accounting principles; for more detail see Biddle et al. (1999). 
 
 
Before reviewing our results in the next section, we note that Mueller (1990) indirectly 
poses two hypotheses regarding the differences we should expect to find when using a 
better measure of profits.  Mueller (1990, p. 14) writes, "We can expect low R2 for 
equations that use accounting profits as the dependent variables..." In short, one would 
expect a larger R2 when using a better measure of what is driving the process that 
researchers aim to model, i.e. the profit drivers.  With respect to the speed of convergence 
(denoted as λˆ1− below), a careful reading of Mueller (1990) suggests we should expect 
our estimate of persistence to be smaller.  “…many accounting practices – like profits 
taxation – tend to “smooth” profits data, thereby importing a degree of convergence 
toward the norm independent of any competitive pressures.”  (p. 195).7 
For completeness, we offer our own hypothesis for how the estimates of steady-
state (or long-run) profits (denoted as ipπˆ  below) should differ when comparing estimates 
from both EVA and unadjusted measures.  Accounting profits should be larger than 
economic profits simply by definition, as the latter include all opportunity costs.  
Together, these insights provide three tests we can carry out by comparing R2, the 
estimates of the speed of convergence and long-run profits. 
 
3 Econometric Methodology and Estimates 
 
In order to facilitate meta-analyses, we use the same empirical methodology as 
previous studies, following Mueller (1990), which we now describe.  The definition of 
"profit" in economics has been the subject of considerable theorizing (Mueller, 1976). 
However, the different categories of profit can be described by defining the components 
of profit rate as itiit src ++=π  where c is the competitive rate of return, ir  is the rent for 
firm i (assume it can be bid away over time, but may be firm specific), and is  is the 
transitory rent. Assuming  is  is defined by ititiit uss += −1λ , then by using the definition 
                                                 
7 Though, as Connoly and Schwartz (1985, p. 388) point out, “Of course, other accounting techniques may 
have the opposite effect, incorporating into a single period’s report costs or revenues more appropriately 
(for an economist’s purposes) spread over several periods.”  With respect to the sign of the persistence 
parameter, we take Mueller’s hypothesis as our null, and Connoly and Schwartz’s as the alternative. 
of itπ  and its , one can rewrite itπ  as ititiiiit urc ++−+= −1)1)(( πλλπ . The first term on 
the right hand side is a constant; call this iα . Therefore, the definition of profits given 
above translates nicely into an autoregressive profits equation,  
 
(2) tiitiiit u++= −1πλαπ  
 
which we have estimated with the Stern Stewart and Co and Compustat data.  The 
empirical methodology is straightforward. For each firm i we will regress current year 
profit rate on last year’s profit rate, obtaining three critical values: the estimates of iα  
and iλ , and the adjusted R2: iαˆ  , iλˆ  and 2R .   Our measure of profit rate will be 
alternatively either EVA or net income.  To each of these, we add interest (from 
Compustat), and divide by total assets (also from Compustat.)  For simplicity we will 
refer to the two measures as EVA, or ROA (for return on assets).8  The long-run, or 
steady-state projected profits of firm i, (or formally, the unconditional mean of the 
autoregressive equation,) is ).ˆ1/(ˆˆ iiip λαπ −=   This is the profit rate that the firm will 
earn in each and every period if nothing in the economic environment changes. 
 We will compare our results obtained with EVA and ROA. The EVA data is from 
the Stern and Stewart Performance 1000.  The unadjusted accounting data is from 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database.  We are interested to see if the hypotheses we 
outline above are supported.  After eliminating firms for which data from the firms in the 
Performance 1000 was not available for all years between 1989 and 2003, and those that 
were not available in our Compustat database, we were left with 331 firms.9 
 In Table 1 and Table 2 we see our estimates of the coefficients in the 
autoregressive equation, respectively, using ROA and EVA.  Let us briefly review our 
hypotheses: our adjusted R2 should be higher, the value of ipπˆ  should be lower, and the 
value of iλˆ  should be lower.   
Comparing the results in the two tables, we see that the first two hypotheses are 
supported, while the third is not.  Adjusted R2 is higher, as expected. It turns out to be 
about four and a half times as high—this is a remarkable improvement in fit.  We also 
find that average long-run profits ipπˆ  are negative in both data sets. That ipπˆ  was lower 
in the EVA data is consistent with the difference we expected to find.  However, tax-
smoothing effects do not seem to bias persistence upward.  If anything other forces act to 
bias accounting measures downward.   
The number of our 331 firms with t-values whose absolute value of ipπˆ  was 
above 1.75 (The critical t-value in a two tailed test) is 308, where 160 of these are 
negative. For Compustat data, 324 firms had absolute value of ipπˆ  greater than 1.75, and 
206 of these were negative. 
 
                                                 
8 Following the literature, both measures are normalized to account for business cycle variation, and 
therefore capture “excess profit.” 
9 The majority of firms were removed from the sample because the Performance 1000 did not contain data 
for all years under study.  Then about 100 firms were removed because data from the Compustat database 
could not be obtained.   
Table 1  Results from autoregressive profits equations, 
tiitiit u++= −1ˆˆ πλαπ , )ˆ1/(ˆˆ iiip λαπ −=   
using Income + Interest / Total Assets 
     
  mean   
  standard   
 mean error minimum maximum 
     
2R  0.0624 -- -0.0833 0.846 
ipπˆ  -0.00191 0.060 -0.623 0.325 
iλˆ  0.2326 0.2718  -2.062 1.943 
     
 
 
 
Table 2  Results from autoregressive profits equations, 
tiitiit u++= −1ˆˆ πλαπ , )ˆ1/(ˆˆ iiip λαπ −=  using EVA / Total Assets 
     
  mean   
  standard   
 mean error minimum maximum 
     
2R  0.2784 -- -0.0831 0.895 
ipπˆ  -0.00367 .8891 -0.806 0.547 
iλˆ  0.5255 0.2325 -0.291 1.048 
     
 
We find that 214 out of 331 firms had significant λˆ ’s in the EVA data, (none of 
these significant λˆ  were negative) and this is much more than the 17 that one would 
expect to find to be significant at that 5% level in a sample of complete noise.  In the 
Compustat data, only 76 firms had positive and significant λˆ ’s, and two firms had 
negative and significant λˆ ’s.  All of this information and more is contained in Table 3 in 
the Appendix, which places firms into one of six subcategories based on their initial 
profit. 
One notable finding, when analyzing the estimates presented in Table 3, should be 
emphasized.  Even though the estimate of the persistence parameter is larger in Table 2 
than in Table 1 (when using EVA rather than ROA), suggesting less competitive 
dynamics, in some regard, we do find greater competitive dynamics in the EVA data.  In 
particular, when using EVA in Table 3, the group with the highest initial profits had only 
the second highest long-run profits.  However, when using ROA, the highest initial group 
also had the highest long-run profits.  Thus, to be precise, one might say the normative 
picture painted here with respect to persistence of profits is actually mixed.  
 
4 Conclusion 
 
Nonetheless, we find the estimate of average persistence is higher when using the 
Stern Stewart measure of economic profits rather than unadjusted accounting measures, 
suggesting accounting profits do not bias persistence upward, although we expected they 
would.  We also find lower long-run profits when EVA is used as the profit measure, and 
this is as we expected.  Taken together, these results suggest a more competitive economy 
in a neoclassical sense, but a less competitive economy in a classical sense.  Overall, it 
would be hard to conclude that the normative assessment of the US economy is radically 
different across both sets of estimates—persistence of about .5, which is what we find 
using EVA, still means that most transitory rents have eroded after about three years.  
Perhaps our most important finding is that, in the AR(1) model, the adjusted R2 is much 
higher when using EVA rather then ROA, as we expected.  However, the improvement in 
fit is unexpectedly dramatic.  Taken all together, these findings suggest that accounting 
measures can be useful in obtaining meaningful estimates, but also that the use of 
accounting measures could be masking real phenomenon.   
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6 Appendix 
Table 3.  Comparison of the persistence of profits in the US; two measures of profit rate 
 
        
  
 
 
EVA over Total Assets, 1989-2003 
331 firms, normalized  
 
ROA, 1989-2003 
331 firms, normalized 
        
Subsample   pπˆ    λˆ    0π     pπˆ    λˆ    0π  
        
1 .0248 .6296 .0764  .0259 .3332 .0758 
2 .0267 .4854 .0233  .0143 .275 .0205 
3 .0072 .4709 .0081  -0.0061 .2138 .0035 
4 -0.0092 .4859 -0.0014  -0.0127 .1569 -0.0084 
5 -0.0244 0.5619 -0.0189  -0.016 .252 -0.0220 
6 -0.0464 .5197 -0.0861  -0.0157 .1645 -0.0681 
        
A  256 (77.3)   130 (39.2) 
B  148 (44.7)   118 (35.6) 
C  160 (48.3)   206 (62.2) 
D  214 (64.6)   76 (22.9) 
E  0 (0)   2 (0) 
F  6    2  
G  0.2542    0.2907  
        
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.  A= number of cases for which 2R  > 0.1 
B= number of cases for which ipπˆ  is significantly positive (10% level, two-tailed test) 
C= number of cases for which ipπˆ  is significantly negative (10% level, two-tailed test) 
D= number of cases for which λˆ  is significantly positive (10% level, two-tailed test) 
E= number of cases for which λˆ  is significantly negative (10% level, two-tailed test) 
F= number of cases with λˆ >1 (In calculation of average ipπˆ  and λˆ  in subsamples and of correlation 
coefficients in row G, the actual value of λˆ  for each firm was used.) 
G= correlation coefficient between ipπˆ  and 0π  
